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Abstract
It is generally understood that people care about their absolute income
position, and several studies have in fact moved beyond this, showing that
people also place considerable signicance on their relative income posi-
tion. However, empirical evidence about the behavioural consequences
is scarce. We address this shortcoming by exploring the relative income
eect in a (controlled) sporting contest environment. Specically, we look
at the pay-performance relationship by working with a large panel data
set consisting of 26 NBA seasons. We explore how closeness aects po-
sitional concerns exploring in detail several potential reference groups.
This allows checking of their relevance and of the scope of comparisons, a
critical aspect in the literature that requires further investigation.
1 Introduction
An often-cited text by Russell (1930, pp. 68-69) points out that: \Napoleon
envied Caesar, Caesar envied Alexander, and Alexander, I daresay, envied Her-
cules, who never existed. You cannot, therefore, get away from envy by means of
success alone, for there will always be in history or legend some person even more
successful than you are". The basketball legend Michael Jordan once confessed
that \I wish I came in rst more often"1. Myers (2004) reports that Alex Ro-
driguez's $252 million, 10-year baseball contract diminished other star players'
satisfaction with their lesser, multimillion-dollar contracts. Positional concerns
caused by relative judgments are common among all sorts of individuals and
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1societies. People constantly compare themselves with their environment and
care greatly about their relative position, which inuences individual choices.
This shows that it is not only the absolute level of an individual's situation
that is important (e.g., income), but also the relative position. Frank (1999)
stresses that the concern about relative position is a \deep-rooted and inerad-
icable element in human nature" (p. 145). He also evaluates in detail several
situations in which an individual's welfare depends on comparisons with others
(Frank, 1991). An individual's decisions have important eects not only for
himself/herself, but also for the frame of reference in which he/she and others
operate. He calls such consequences positional externalities and shows how such
externalities help to explain, for example, twenty-four-hour supermarkets, exces-
sive formalism in economics, cycles of fashion and public spiritedness, muddled
bureaucratic language, excessive cosmetic surgery and pressures to consume
growth hormones. He concludes that \[...] the more we learn about them,
the more likely it seems that actions without external eects may be the real
exceptions" (p. 44). Schoolteachers sometimes ask parents not to pack special
treats in children's lunches as other classmates become envious (Elster, 1991).
Likewise, school uniforms help to reduce possible envy among pupils.
However, while we can observe an eect on individual choices, can we observe
a relative income eect on productivity? The relative income eect has been
documented in several empirical studies working mainly with attitudinal ques-
tions (Fischer & Torgler, 2007), but empirical evidence about the behavioural
consequences remains scarce.
Neumark and Postlewaite (1998), for example, asked whether women's deci-
sions to seek paid employment depend in any way on the employment or incomes
of other women. They therefore investigate the question whether relative income
comparisons could aect their employment decision. As a reference group they
focus on women's siblings, but instead of making comparisons between sisters,
they investigate whether women's employment is aected by the employment of
their sisters-in-law and whether women's employment is aected by the income
of their husbands relative to the income of their sisters' husbands. Their results
strongly support the relevance of positional concerns.
The eects of relative position extend beyond the social and individual de-
cision processes: It has determined that relative position aects health and
important biochemical processes in the nervous system (for an overview see
Frank & Sunstein, 2001). A higher relative position is correlated with better
health. There is even evidence that supports the link between relative income
and disease. Furthermore, some biological evidence indicates that changes in
social status are correlated with physiological changes (Frank, 1985) and that
status dierentiation is common among various animals (Coelho, 1985). By ap-
plying this theory to a real life data set from a competitive sport environment we
try to further behavioural evidence. Thus, in this study the environment of the
National Basketball Association (NBA) is used as a testing ground to observe
how the relative income position aects productivity in a relatively controlled
environment.
In particular, we explore how closeness aects positional concerns. Pleban
and Tesser (1981) stress: \The closer another is, the more likely one is to engage
in comparison processes" (p. 279). We explore a large variety of reference groups
in the current analysis and note that surprisingly, a detailed discussion about
reference groups is missing in the economics literature.
2Amiel and Cowell (1999, pp. 2-3), for example, say: \We should explicitly
dene the 'universe': the collection of persons or groups within which inequality
comparisons are to be made [...] But as far as the third point on the list is
concerned - the appropriate reference group - one is immediately struck by the
lack of references in the mainstream economics literature. Why this apparent
neglect of one of the main components of income distribution analysis?"
Some previous studies have provided a theoretical background with regard
to comparisons and addressing the issue of a reference group (Festinger 1954).
However, understanding just who is in the social reference group and what the
behavioural consequences are, is an underexplored social science research ques-
tion. Kulik and Ambrose (1992, p. 212) also stress: \Despite the demonstrated
value of comparison theories, these theories share a common problem. Predic-
tion of an individual's response depends on the referent used by the individual".
Thus, our paper will try to reduce such a shortcoming providing behavioural
evidence observing individuals' behaviour in a competitive work environment
focusing on a variety of reference groups.
The second section of this paper will provide the theoretical background
while also developing our key research hypothesis. Section 3 introduces the
data set and discusses our main variables. Section 4 provides the empirical
results and Section 5 nishes with some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Considerations
The basic framework of this research consists of the conjunction of the following
two questions: How is a worker's productivity composed and how is this pro-
ductivity then aected by the relative income position. Generally, we assume
the following utility function:
Ui = ui(si;d(si;~ s);C(ei)) (1)
where si is the salary of the worker, d(si;~ s) is the distance of the workers
salary to the vector of salaries of his/her reference group ~ s and C(ei) is the cost
the worker experiences for the chosen level of eort ei. Furthermore we assume
that a workers' productivity (pi) depends on the workers ability (ai) and the
eort (ei) the person puts into his/her task (pi = ai  ei).
It is also assumed that while ability is a function of the person's general skills,
it remains constant over time. Another basic assumption for our research is that
the person alters their eort level according to his or her level of motivation in
this period (mit). This means that eort is a function of a worker's motivation
(Equation 2). The motivation is aected by the absolute income position (sit)
as well as the perceived relative income position (d(sit;~ st)), which can be seen
as an indicator of recognition.
eit = f(mit)  sit + d(sit;~ st) (2)
When people compare their income position, it is with people close to them-
selves (Layard, 2003). This is usually referred to as the reference group, though
it is unclear what the most accurate reference group for income comparisons
is. Moreover, it is possible that more than one reference group is relevant for
an individual. Thus, it is useful to explore the impact of dierent reference
3groups. Shah (1998) stresses: \Given the importance of social referents within
organizations, it is astounding that the issue of the social referent has only
been addressed in general term. [...] Laboratory studies examining both social
comparisons and equity theories have been conducted in settings with only one
available referent" (p. 253). Akerlof (1997) develops a model of social distance
introducing heterogeneity to show how social interactions can produce dierent
subgroups.
It can be assumed that workers within the same organizations have an incen-
tive to compare themselves with co-workers. Biological research has observed
species-specic interaction distances for a variety of animals. Social life is regu-
lated by territoriality and an instinctive attachment to place (Baldassare, 1978).
In Aristotle's Rhetoric (book II, chapter 10), it is posited that envy is felt
only towards those people who are our equals or our peers. Similarly, Francis
Bacon writes in his Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral that proximity denes
the reference group as \near kinsfolks, and fellows in oce, and those that have
been bred together". Festinger (1954) points out that people do not generally
compare themselves with the rest of the world, but with a much more specic
group, typically with others they see as being similar to themselves or, in his
words, \close to one's own ability" (p. 121). Closeness is often referred to a
situation where a group of individuals are seen to be in a unit relation (Heider,
1958; Pleban & Tesser, 1981), such as being teammates. Homans (1961) intro-
duces yet another facet of social comparison into the literature: and that is the
dimension of exchange. The situation itself determines who would be selected
for comparisons. Thus, the reference group would generally be other individ-
uals that are involved in exchanges (e.g., teammates or players in the same
basketball region). Other theorists have proposed that the feeling of inequality
is a function of psychological and perceived closeness (Pritchard, 1969). This
suggestion opens up the possibility of a variety of reference groups (teammates,
players with the same position etc.). Interestingly, Campbell's (1978) results
suggest that situational and work-related dimensions are much more critical
than psychological closeness.
In general, the existence of discrepancies with respect to diering abilities
and interactions leads to actions that reduce the discrepancy. Thus, we should
observe behavioural consequences. Soldiers in World War II seem to have made
comparisons primarily with members of their own military group (Stouer,
1949). Interestingly, military police soldiers were more satised with their rate of
promotion than were air corpsmen of comparable rank although military police
soldiers had one of the slowest rate of promotion among all branches of services
and the air corps had the most rapid rate of advancement in the entire army.
Observable frustrations expressed by U.S. Air Corps soldiers during World War
II are able to be explained using the relative deprivation theory. A relatively
rapid promotion rate for the group leads to a frustration about their own pro-
motion rates as other colleagues' promotions inated expectations, inevitably
resulting in disappointment.
These papers strongly inuenced the reference group theory (see also Merton
& Rossi, 1968; Merton, 1968). Concepts such as relative deprivation and the
theory of social comparison are part of the reference group theory. Results in
that area indicate that a reference group is not selected randomly. The more
similar the characteristics of others to ones' self, the higher the probability that
a person will choose such individuals as a reference group for comparison pur-
4poses (Rubel, 1977). The network literature stresses that structural similarity to
one another leads to an increase in issue-related communication and positioning
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Similarity also induces a competitive
orientation and a higher level of identication (Friedkin, 1993). The attractive-
ness of referents can also be function of information availability about potential
referents (Goodman, 1977). Workers' closeness reduces information costs and
the complexity of such a decision process.
Clark and Oswald (1996) show that people's reference groups are individuals
with similar personal characteristics, such as gender, job and so on. Closeness
is also seen to increase with physical proximity, similarity in origins, age, back-
ground etc. (Pleban & Tesser, 1981).
Thus, it can be assumed that basketball players, as in other team sports,
compare themselves with other basketball players, such as team-mates or league
players, due to the same work prole.
In this study we investigate whether closeness mediates a relative income
eect. We therefore explore dierent levels of closeness. We can generally
assume that the distance or closeness to all possible reference groups inuence
workers' motivation and therefore also their performance. We can write this





where ~ sj denotes the vector of salaries for the reference group which are
ordered in increasing personal distance j = [1;2;:::;n]. With this specication
we can build our main hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1 The eect of the relative income position is stronger for
closer reference groups than for reference groups with a less close bond. (j >
j+1)
In the following section we will discuss two additional key aspects in the
paper, namely performance or productivity in relation to income and the relative
income position in this context.
2.1 Pay and Performance
Empirical analysis of the behavioural impact of positional concerns is hindered
by the lack of useful income data. Researchers have therefore searched for
environments where useful data is available. The availability of sports data
has led to a growing empirical literature, testing theories in promotion tourna-
ments with sports data where pay and performance relationships can be fairly
well measured (Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990a, 1990b; Melton & Zorn, 2000;
Orszag, 1994; Sunde, 2003; Maloney & McCormick, 2000; Torgler, Schmidt, &
Frey, 2007). It is not only the availability but also the low variable errors that
contribute to the use of sports data to explore the behavioural and labour ques-
tion. In this paper we focus on basketball games. They are comparable to eld
experiments, because a match takes place in a controlled environment, where
basketball players are faced with the same rules and other outside restrictions.
Hence, when investigating the connection between relative income concern and
5performance, many factors can be controlled for. The majority of empirical
evidence using sports data supports the positive impact of monetary incentives
on sporting performance2.
2.2 Relative Income Position
Economists have included interdependent preferences to allow for social compar-
isons, and have also stressed the relevance of the relative position (e.g. Becker,
1974; Easterlin, 1974; Scitovsky, 1976; Schelling, 1978; Pollak, 1976; Boskin &
Sheshinski, 1978; Frank, 1985; Ng, 1997; Akerlof & Yellen, 1990). Other so-
cial sciences, such as social psychology, sociology or anthropology, have placed
considerable emphasis on the signicance of relative preferences as being fun-
damental to human motivation. The psychological theory of social comparison
and the sociological theory of relative deprivation suggest that a person may
get frustrated when his or her situation (e.g., individual earnings) falls relative
to the reference group. If improvement of the situation is slower than expected,
frustration can even lead to aggression (see e.g., Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).
McAdams (1992) states: \social science evidence suggests that people gen-
erally share a strong desire for social distinction, and in particular that people
desire relatively high income and the goods associated with high income or
status" (p. 48). Research on happiness (for example, Easterlin, 1974, 1995,
2001; Clark & Oswald, 1996; McBride, 2001; Frey & Stutzer, 2002a, 2002b;
Stutzer, 2004; Layard, 2003; Luttmer, 2005; Carbonell, 2005) has stressed and
found strong empirical support for the importance of the relative position. Also,
laboratory experiments, using the ultimatum game, show that subjects are con-
cerned with their relative position (Frank & Sunstein, 2001; Kirchsteiger, 1994;
Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).
As an alternative strategy, some researchers have used hypothetical ques-
tions about choices between alternative states or outcomes, where the choices
allow checking of relative positional concerns (Alpizar, Carlsson, & Johansson-
Stenman, 2005; Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson, & Daruvala, 2002; Solnick &
Hemenway, 1998; Tversky & Grin, 1991; Zeckhauser, 1991) ). Even so, many
economists are still sceptical about the importance of positional concerns, argu-
ing that in any real economic situation competition will crowd out the relative
income eect3.
However empirical evidence from eld data about its behavioural relevance
remains scarce. (Senik, 2005) for example provides an overview of the litera-
ture, and points out that \it is surprising that in spite of the large theoretical
literature on relative income and comparison eects [...] empirical validation
of this conjecture is still scarce" (p. 47).
We are going to explore the impact of the relative income position in a work
environment, where positional concerns seem to be widespread. Layard (2003)
points out: \[In] organisations, calm can often be maintained only by keep-
ing peoples' salaries secret" (p. 8). Elster (1991) reports that in China, model
workers spend their bonus on a good meal for everybody to avoid harassment by
2Please see Torgler et al. (2007) for an in-depth analysis of this literature.
3This can easily illustrated by imagining an ultimatum game where 11 proposers make
their share oer to 10 responders that can pick their partner in some subsequent way. This
would lead to a far more equal distribution since the proposers feel the fear of being the one
left without a trading partner.
6their colleagues. A manager keeps bonuses low because he fears the other work-
ers and because he wants to avoid the envy of other executive ocers. (Frank
& Sunstein, 2001) report that surveys of employers and employees suggest that
salaries depend on what employees think other people are paid and that the
perception of the relative position has a large eect on their morale. Similarly,
our model suggests that it also aects the eort put into their work.
3 Data and Proxy Description
This section provides a short overview of the data properties, which is followed
by a detailed explanation of the proxies used for the various variables.
3.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Analysis
The data for this study is mainly derived from three dierent sources. As
outlined above, data for sport events is usually available as event organisers
and the fan community collect the data and publish it on various websites.
This allows collection of a lot of data with a little eort and further validates
the various sources by comparison. This does not mean the process is straight
forward, as dierent issues for linking and properly attributing the data arises.
All data are collected using web crawler techniques with low impact on the
target sites' trac, similar to the way search engines collect information about
the web sites indexed.
The main data source used for this study to gain the performance mea-
surement is databasebasketball.com. This site provides detailed statistics of
3597 NBA players starting from the season 1946/47 until today. It also pro-
vides overviews of yearly performance details and added information for the
players such as place of birth, birthday, college, weight and height. There is a
total of N = 18500 observations for the yearly totals. Complete measurements
of all performance indicators used (see Section 3.2) are available from the sea-
son 1976/77 as the detail of recording varies beforehand. Table 6 shows the
descriptive properties of this data.
The website usatoday.com provides salary information for 756 NBA players
for the seasons 2001/02 till 2006/07 (N = 2509 observations). The data was
initially collected by USA TODAY's reporter David DuPree. For the seasons
before 2001/02, additional salary sources provide information the 1621 NBA
players from 1967/68 till 1999/2000 (with gaps4).
The current match-up of players' name and the team played results in 1733
NBA players for the seasons 1979/80 till 2006/07 (7676 observations) using an
unbalanced panel5.
3.2 Proxy for productivity
As we have seen from the previous section various performance measurements
are available for most of the players for over 50 seasons. The question that
4We noted some variations of spellings and some faults in entering the data. So the data
was cleaned and obvious outliers were excluded from the analysis. Entries for players playing
for several dierent teams in the same season were also excluded.
5We did not replace missing values or impute any other data.
7arises for this study is how to map those single measurements into a valid proxy
for a player's productivity. All the measurements presented are on a per game
basis, as this is the appropriate unit of payment6. The most basic method of
observing an NBA player's productivity would be to observe the total points





This measurement captures only the instant reward of the \in game" per-
formance measurement. What is left out is the player's indirect contribution to
the success of the team, but this measurement should provide a good proxy for
changes in the player's eort. This measurement will be used even though it
omits some factors of a player's productivity.
If one looks for a more sophisticated way to capture a player's performance,
a widely used method comes with Equation 5. The basic notion of this factor
is that one adds all the good things that a player can do. Notably points
scored (PTS), total rebounds (TREB), steals (STL), blocks (BLK), and assist
(AST). And then subtract the bad things (turnovers (TO), eld goals missed
(FGM) and free throws missed (FTM).
pnba =
(PTS + TREB + STL + BLK + AST)   (TO + FGMS + FTMS)
game
(5)
While this proxy gives a more in-depth picture of the player's performance,
there are still some weak points about the ability to capture all important
details. Primarily, it is questionable if all those indicators should be of equal
weight. It is easy to see that a steal and a turnover would even each other out, as
the loss in one team (turnover) is the gain for the other team (steal). But if we
consider blocks or assists the question of equal weights must be posed. Although
this is no perfect measurement of the player's productivity, it should provide
a good indicator in a panel environment with respect to a player's change of
performance.
Berri and Krautmann (2006) try to cover this topic. They stress that after
points scored, the possession of the ball is the major success contributor in a
basketball game. So they calculate their performance indicator (Equation 6)
by adding or subtracting all the events that result in a change of possession
from the points scored. Moreover they tested this formula for the marginal
contribution to the winning percentage for the team. They nd that all factors
except free throws missed are equal in weight. This abnormality can easily be
explained by the fact that there is a high chance that a free throw results in
points scored.
ppos =
PTS   FGA   0:44  FTA + TREB + STL   TO
game
(6)
Hence, this measurement seems to capture most of the productivity of the
player. Based on the reasoning outlined beforehand, we will conduct our analysis
6Even though we can assume that some players on the payroll are paid on a per season
basis.
8with all three dierent measurements (psimple, pnba and ppos) to see if the results
remain stable.
3.3 Relative Income Position
Another important question is how to model the relative income position. The
main task is to identify the relevant reference group and to nd a proxy for how
people perceive their relative income position. It can be argued that people
will change their performance in accordance with the absolute dierence to
their reference group. So they would perceive their relative position through
monetary dierences to their reference group's average as outlined in Equation
7.





salaryjt)   salaryit (7)
where salaryit is the salary of player i at a given time t and n is the number




the average salaries of the other members in the reference group. It can be
argued that this purely monetary view does not eectively capture the reality.
Yet this value does eectively represent the distance between the player's income
position and the set of the income positions of the other players in the specic
reference group. The new variable has a mean of zero for each reference group
and so also for the entire sample.
3.4 Reference Groups Denitions
The nal concept we have to dene for our evaluation is how to model the play-
ers' reference groups. As we have previously established, people tend to compare
themselves with the people that are close or similar to them. Considering the
rather special markets of basketball players we can stretch this denition to
some extent 7.
The broadest possible conception of the model assumes that a player com-
pares himself to the situation within the whole NBA league (League). It is
further assumed that the salary structure of the whole NBA is transparent to
the player. He is therefore able to determine his standing. Within the dataset,
is possible to narrow down potential reference groups. For the rst specication
it is assumed that the player only compares himself to other players within the
league playing the same position (Pos).
Network theories suggest there are strong interactions and a high level of
competition between people who occupy similar positions (Burt, 1987, 1998).
It is in a player's interest to observe and interact with other players that have
the same position to remain informed about the development of the others.
Such interactions with similar fellows promote social comparisons. Peter Blau
(1962) studies case-workers in a public welfare agency. He observes a segregation
eect among people who shared a similar orientation. Judith Blau (1974) uses
data from an international sample of theoretical high energy physicists and
7It is dicult to model exactly each player's social network. This study abstracts from the
depths of reality and our proxies should be seen as best-of-concepts.
9nds that homogeneity in various personal characteristics (e.g., having the same
specialized interests and similar role) leads to stronger interactions. Similarity
has often been related to abilities in the theory of social comparison. In other
words, a player compares himself to someone close to his abilities or opinion.
Under incomplete information players search for relative standing information
along the ability dimension. Individuals choose to learn more about others
who aect his own standing (Wilson, 1973). Further studies have extended the
approach focusing on attribute similarity linked to the performance environment
(Gastorf & Suls, 1978). In our context, this would mean that players have a
high level of incentive to acquire information about players who are active in the
same position. This promotes social comparisons and positional concern eects.
Moreover, basketball players are relatively mobile which suggests that external
reference groups such as players with the same position may be relevant.
From the literature on workplace comparisons we draw the conclusion that
similar experience is very important. We try to capture experience in two dif-
ferent ways. A very crude experience indicator is age (Age). Since the NBA is
the high end of all basketball leagues, it can be assumed that all NBA players
have played since their early childhood. This obviously does not hold for all the
players but it should be reasonable for the majority of the players.
The second indicator we use for experience is more data driven. Assuming
that the top league is dierent from the leagues below we take years of expe-
rience within the NBA as a proxy for players' experience (Exp). While this is
certainly a bad proxy for newcomers within the league who might have very
diverse backgrounds, the proxy should be able to capture the dierences for
the more senior players. Another possible measurement for comparison might
be geographical distance. The existing NBA league regions are used to model
subgroups of players that have a closer relationship due to the fact that they
work and live in the same region (Region).
On the other hand all those groups are still fairly large which induces re-
strictions in their personal interactions. Network research agenda suggest that
geography is a basic source of closeness (McPherson et al., 2001). The likelihood
of contacts increases with geographic closeness. On other hand, it takes more
eort to make contact with players who are far away than those who are readily
available. This also would induce a stronger positional concern eect within
the same team. However, new technologies loosen such restrictions leading to
curvilinear relationships between space and interactions \with very close prox-
imity no longer being so privileged over intermediate distances but both being
considerably more likely than distant relations. Geographic space also seems
more important in determining the 'thickness' of a relationship (its multiplexity
and the frequency of actual contact) than it does in determining the presence
of a tie" (McPherson et al., 2001, p. 430).
The groups we have dened so far are rather large and anonymous. We will
refer to them as high-level reference groups. If we narrow the concept to only
the most personal connections and interactions, a very reasonable assumption is
that the player compares himself to the other members of his team (Team). This
addresses the problem of personal distance, but creates the problem that a team
needs a heterogeneous group of players with various talents and functions. As
our proxy for the relative income position becomes unreasonable for very small
groups a further break down (e.g. position) at the team level is not feasible.
To compare other joint classications we focus only on groups with more
10than three members and with a certain degree of homogeneity. This leaves
us with region and position (RegPos), region and age (RegAge), region and
experience (RegExp), position and age (PosAge) and position and experience
(PosExp)8.
Results presented by Oldham, Kulik, Stepina, and Ambrose (1986), for ex-
ample, suggest that employees who used other-inside referents to evaluate com-
pensation and job complexity tended to have a long organizational tenure, while
those who had short tenure tended to use self-outside referents. Thus, it makes
sense to combine experience, age with an outside reference group such as region.
Table 1 gives and overview of the reference groups in our sample.
Table 1: Summary of reference groups
Reference Group Groups Members Min. Max.
High-level reference groups:
Pos (Position) 3 40.91 10 171
Reg (Region) 6 12.95 4 75
Age 17 10.49 1(3) 52
Exp (Experience) 16 15.02 1(3) 71
Low-level reference groups:
Team 24 2.38 1(3) 20
RegPos 17 7.24 1(3) 34
PosAge 43 4.88 1(3) 24
RegAge 67 2.51 1(3) 15
PosExp 40 6.63 1(3) 32
RegExp 68 3.00 1(3) 16
There are now ten dierent notions of reference groups. To test the robust-
ness of our design we are going to run each of these specications separately to
check if there are any major discrepancies between the models. Also note that
the results from the high-level group comparisons are not directly comparable
to the low-level group denitions, since the number of members in the group
changes the variance of the specication.
4 Empirical Results
To test the quality of our specications we rst compare three possible regres-
sions (pooling regression, clustered regression and xed model) with each of our
reference group models. The baseline equation for all those models is shown in
Equation 8.
pit = 0 + 1relSalit + 2salaryit (8)
+ 3CTRLit + 4TEAMDit + 5TDt
where pit is the performance of player i in season t, relSalit
The regression also contains several control variables CTRLit such as age,
age2, players' position in the game (center, forward, defence) and team dummy
8Note that age and experience are not used as a joint group as they capture the same basic
concept.
11variables (TEAMDit), as many players change their position in the eld and
their team over time.
Team dummy variables are included, as it can be argued that the results are
driven by unobserved team characteristics that are correlated with income and
performance. Team xed eects allow us to control for such possible omitted
variable bias. But estimates without team eects are also reported to go beyond
a within-team focus. Similarly, the estimates include season dummies (TDt) to
control for possible dierences in the players' environment.
Table 2 reports the results for the high-level reference groups, Table 3 the
results for the low-level reference groups. The rst simple OLS regressions with
beta or standardized regression coecients are reported, with the results reveal-
ing the relative importance of the variables used. To obtain robust standard
errors in these estimations, we use the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of
standard errors. Additionally, we include in Table 2 the OLS regressions with
clustered standard errors by players since this will pick up any player-specic
characteristics that change over time. Similarly, we control for ability of the in-
dividual players by using xed eects regressions in the third specication. Since
the additional regressions show the stability of the model we do not report them
in Table 3. It should be noted that we have tested all of our regressions with all
three productivity proxies lined out in Section 3.2 and that the results remain
robust. We choose to report pnba since it incorporates the largest amount of
factors, and is consequently more likely to capture changes in players' behaviour
even though the weight of the individual factors might not be fully accurate.
Since we are neither predicting nor evaluating the coecients or marginal eects,















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14The stability of the model is clearly represented in this table, and obviously
declines for more narrow reference group denitions, as the number of observa-
tions drops.
To check the dierences between reference groups we run the regressions with
more than one reference group in the specication. Furthermore, to minimize
the eects of multicollinearity we only introduce two indicators at a time. Our
model then reads like Equation 9.
pit = 0 + 1relSalAit + 2relSalBit + 3salaryit (9)
+ 4CTRLit + 5TEAMDit + 6TDt
Where relSalAit and relSalBit are the relative salary dierences using the
dierent reference group models. The results remain robust over all the speci-
cations previously analysed. We use beta coecients to investigate the relative
role played by dierent reference groups. The values for the high-level refer-
ence group are reported in Table 4, and the values for the low-level groups are
reported in Table 5.
Table 4: Beta Coecients for High-Level Reference Groups
HHHH H A
B
Pos Exp Age Reg
Pos 1 - -.52 -.532 -.623
2 - -.0953 -.315 -.437
(1=2) - 5.46 1.69 1.43
Exp 1 -.0953 - -.0125 -.0974
2 -.52 - -.32 -.448
(1=2) 0.18 - 0.039 0.22
Age 1 -.315 -.32 - -.316
2 -.532 -.0125 - -.442
(1=2) 0.53 25.6 - 0.71
Reg 1 -.437 -.448 -.442 -
2 -.623 -.0974 -.316 -
(1=2) 0.70 4.60 1.40 -
To facilitate the interpretation of those results we also report the ratio 1=2
in both tables. These values show us the relative importance of each pair.
With this pair-wise comparison we can then rank our reference group models
accordingly.
Looking at Table 4 we can see that playing in the same position clearly has
the strongest impact, followed by playing in the same basketball region. Thus,
similar work proles enhance a relative income eect. The distance to the same
age group comes third in terms of inuencing the performance. On the other
hand, the comparison to players with the same experience seemed to play the
lowest mediating eect on players' performance.
Inspection of the results on low-level reference groups in Table 5 highlights
that the comparison to team mates has the strongest impact on performance.
This is followed by the reference groups that incorporate position and age and
position and region. Again, the proxies using experience as an attribute for
15Table 5: Beta Coecients for Low-Level Reference Groups
HHHH H A
B
Team PA PE RP RA RE
Team 1 - -.302 -.308 -.275 -.272 -.282
2 - -.215 -.090 -.149 -.108 -.053
(1=2) - 1.40 3.43 1.84 2.52 5.32
PosAge 1 -.215 - -.2 -.214 -.187 -.206
2 -.302 - -.053 -.19 -.071 -.033
(1=2) 0.71 - 3.78 1.12 2.62 6.34
PosExp 1 -.090 -.053 - -.09 -.059 -.093
2 -.308 -.2 - -.194 -.106 .0007
(1=2) .290 0.26 - 0.46 0.56 131.04
RegPos 1 -.149 -.19 -.194 - -.158 -.18
2 -.275 -.214 -.09 - -.113 -.055
(1=2) 0.54 0.88 2.16 - 1.40 3.28
RegAge 1 -.108 -.071 -.106 -.113 - -.118
2 -.272 -.187 -.059 -.158 - -.032
(1=2) 0.40 0.89 1.79 0.71 - 0.72
RegExp 1 -.053 -.033 .0007 -.055 -.032 -
2 -.282 -.206 -.093 -.18 -.118 -
(1=2) 0.19 0.16 0.008 0.30 1.40 -
comparison have the lowest positional impact on individual performances. In
sum, the results indicate that our hypothesis cannot be rejected. Closeness
mediates the relative income eect quite substantially.
5 Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to explore the scope in which relative income position
matters. It is highly appropriate to analyse the relevance of dierent reference
groups. Previous literature has mainly developed and implemented one particu-
lar reference group without comparing alternative reference groups and without
testing dierences between potential reference groups. To reduce such a short-
coming, we analyse the hypothesis whether the relative income eect is stronger
for closer reference groups than for reference groups with a less close bond.
Comparing the dierent reference groups we were able to see that the strongest
eect of positional concerns on performance is driven by similar work proles
(playing the same position) and playing with teammates (daily colleagues). On
the other hand, geographical closeness, or age and experience closeness is less
relevant. We also observe that more narrowly dened reference groups have a
stronger impact than more loosely dened reference groups.
In general, our testing ground was the controlled and highly competitive
environment of the highest professional basketball league, the NBA. We observe
behavioural consequences of positional concerns at the professional level and the
eects are driven by job prole closeness and personal and daily interactions.
Thus, it may be useful to take into account such positional concern eects when
designing company and corporation salary and incentive schemes.
16The ndings in regard to external reference groups (e.g., same position)
might be comparable to situations of upper echelon employees or CEOs, who
have a high level of information transparency and are associated with a great
mobility across organizations. Moreover, workers in large companies or gov-
ernment organizations with dierent oces may react in a similar manner as
players in the NBA market. In addition, similar tendencies may be observable
in international environments such as academia or research centres. Finally, our
results might be relevant for work environments with greater uncertainty and
performance ambiguity where information seeking and social comparison be-
haviour is more prevalent. However, more empirical evidence that investigates
to what extent such results can be generalized is required.
A Tables
Table 6: Summary statistics databasebasketball.com
Variable N / Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
players 3597 - - -
teams 37 - - -
seasons 60 - 1946 2006
age 26.58 3.737 18 44
weight 208.751 25.567 133 330
height 198.915 9.359 160.02 231.14
seasons in same team 3.83 3.09 1 19
total number of seasons 9.319 4.817 1 24
games played / season 52.13 26.654 1 83
minutes played / season 1281.252 971.809 1 3882
points / season 538.738 512.715 0 4029
points / game 8.588 6.277 0 50.4
Table 7: Summary of merged data
Variable N / Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
players 1733 - - -
teams 29 - - -
seasons 26 - 1980 2006
games played / season 58.464 23.259 1 83
minutes played / season 1440.817 933.837 1 3533
points / season 606.698 507.685 0 3041
salary 2.182 3.016 0.005 33.1
salary / game 0.052 0.166 0 6.3
salary / minute 0.004 0.015 0 0.63
17Table 8: Summary performance indicators
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
psimple 9.158 6.267 0 37.085
pnba 10.251 6.553 -3 36.988
ppos 3.74 3.003 -3.293 19.373
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